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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
facts to mean that the contract by which vendor agreed to pay$90,000 to B was made for B being the procuring cause of the sale
and not in consideration of the indemnity agreement. Adopting
this interpretation, which allows substance to prevail over forn,the claims of both A and B would then be based purely on com-
missions earned; they would be mutually exclusive; interpleader
could be allowed. See dissent, Norman v. Oakland Golf Club,
supra at 961, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 861.
Donald J. Holzman
LABOR LAW- STATE JURISDJCTION PREEMPTED
In order to induce an interstate trucker's employees to joinit, defendant union posted pickets at petitioner's loading platform,
though there was no labor dispute or strike in progress. Pefi-
tioner, whose business fell off by as much as 95% as a result of the
refusal of other unionized carriers to cross the line, obtained aninjunction under state law prohibiting such picketing. Held,
unanimously affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's vacat-ing of the injunction, jurisdiction of such practices is vested ex-
clusively in the National Labor Relations Board. Garner v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A. F. L.),
74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
The instant decision is another in a long line of cases whichhas taken up the task of defining the respective areas of state andfederal jurisdiction in the field of concerted labor activities, be-ginning with the proposition that where "federal administrationhas made comprehensive regulations effectively governing the sub-ject matter of the statute, . . . state regulation in the field of the
statute is invalid even though that particular phase of the subjecthas not been taken up by the federal agency." Bethlehem SteelCo. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947).As to certain areas of labor relations, federal action is in terms
exclusive; e. g., representation proceedings, 29 U. S. C. A. § 159.In others, state action is in terms permitted; e. g., union shop
agreements, 29 U. S. C. A. § 164(b). Problems arise in that area
where federal law has not completely occupied the field.
The wholesale extension of federal power over the field of
union unfair labor practices, an area which, prior to the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act, was solely a state concern, has re-
sulted in a considerable amount of litigation. States may notpromulgate a policy contrary to that of the federal act, Inter-
national Union, U. A. W. A., C. I. 0. v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454(1950), even in the exercise of their police powers, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street, Electrical Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383 (1951). On the
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other hand, state jurisdiction is not pre-empted where the ac-
tivities in question are neither protected nor prohibited in the
federal act. International Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. L. v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245 (1949) (re-
peated unannounced work stoppages), Algoma Plywoold and
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S.
301 (1949) (discharge of employee under union shop agreement).
Cf. Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 338 U. S. 953 (1950).
As to the precise problem presented in the instant case, the
status of an otherwise protected activity being used in such a way
as to constitute a possible unfair labor practice, state courts arc
in conflict, some holding that federal jurisdiction is exclusive,
Gerry of Oalifornia v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles
County, 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P. 2d 689 (1948), Norris Grain Co. v.
Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950), Garner v. Team-
sters Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. 2d 893 (1953); others, that state
jurisdiction remains. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N. Y. 300,
101 N. E. 2d 697 (1951), Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362
Mo. 375, 241 S. W. 2d 886 (1951).
In Goodwins v. Hagedorn, supra, the leading New York case
on the subject, the union picketed customer entrances to peti-
tioner's retail store in an effort to compel the management to
recognize it as bargaining agent for the store employees despite
the fact that representation proceedings involving this and a com-
peting union were pending before the N. L. R. B. In a 4-3 de-
cision, the Court of Appeals upheld state jurisdiction to issue an
injunction on the ground that the conduct in question was not in
terms prohibited by the federal act.
The instant case leaves Goodwins in some doubt. Though the
picketing situation in Garner was similar, the Court rested its de-
cision on that clause of the Taft-Hartley Act which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to bring pressure on an em-
ployer to discriminate against employees as a means toward en-
couraging or discouraging membership in a labor union rather
than that clause which outlaws secondary boycotts, which would
seem to be more clearly applicable. But Garner is susceptible of
two interpretations. Narrowly interpreted, the opinion may be
read as holding that as to peaceful picketing which is designed to
bring pressure on the employer to break the law, state jurisdic-
tion remains where the picketing is not specifically prohibited by
the federal act. Broadly interpreted, the opinion states that all
state jurisdiction in the field of peaceful picketing is pre-empted.
Under its broad holding, Garner clearly overrules Goo&wins;
even under its narrow holding, it may be argued that Goodwins
is, on its facts, overruled (the picketing there has the same coercive
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effect as in Garner, for purposes of § 8(b) (1) and (2)) though its
rationale is not (once it is determined that the activity is neither
prohibited nor protected by the federal act, it may be dealt with
by the states).
The case illustrates the continuing trend of removing labor
controversies from the sphere of state action. To the argument
that it is desirable that labor relations be governed by a uniform
law, it may be answered that in many cases involving small, pre-
dominantly local businesses, conduct such as that in the principal
case is likely to cause irreparable harm within too short a space of
time for federal procedures to be effective. It is suggested that
state action rather than federal is more appropriate where such
is the case. Congressional action in the direction of clarifying
legislative intent as to these jurisdictional problems seems war-
ranted.
Joh* J. Cooney
WILLS - EFFECT OF TAXES ON ELECTIVE SHARE
A widow elected to take against the will of her deceased hus-
band. Held (4-1): The maximum limitation on her elective share
is calculated before deducting estate taxes, and not after as con-
tended by the principal legatee. In re Wolf's Will 282 App. Div.
1018, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 302 (1st. Dep't 1953), afflrming per curiam,
204 Misc. 356, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 412 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
N. Y. Decedent Estate Law § 18(1) (a) grants the widow her
share of the estate as in intestacy, but "in no event . . . [is she]
entitled to take more than one half of the net estate of the de-
cedent, after the deduction of . . .any estate tax."
If the testator makes no provision for the payment of estate
taxes, as in the instant case, the burden of the tax is apportioned
among the beneficiaries and "any exemption or deduction allowed
under the law imposing the tax by reason of the relation of any
person to the decedent . . . shall inure to the benefit of the person
bearing such relationship." N. V. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 124(3).
Thus to the extent that a marital deduction results in a tax sav-
ing to the estate, the widow is to receive its full benefit.
The conflict with § 18(1) (a), which literally read imposes a tax
burden on the widow by requiring deduction of taxes on the estate
as a whole before calculating the maximum limitation on the elec-
tive share, was resolved by allowing the apportionment statute to
control.
The surrogate reached his decision primarily on authority
of an Appellate Division case, not directly in point as the maximum
limitation was not litigated, which stated that "the term 'any
estate tax' used in section 18 subdivision 1(a), Decedent Estate
